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KJRCHE JM SOZJALJSMUS: EAST GERMAN PROTESTANTISM'S 
POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL WITNESS, 1945-1990. 
By John S. Conway 
John S. Conway is Professor of History at the University of British Columbia. He is the 
author of The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-1945 (New York: Basic Books, 
1969) as well as numerous articles on recent German church history, the Vatican, and 
Christian-Jewish relations in the twentieth century. 
In the beginning was the church--and no State. Germany's inglorious capitulation of 
May 1945, as Martin Greschat has rightly noted, 1 left the Christian churches bereft of the 
established support they had enjoyed for centuries from princes, electors, kings, and even 
their secular successors. The physical ruin of Germany, the occupation of the whole country 
by foreign armies, the collapse of all national authority, the roving bands of displaced 
persons, the desperate shortages of food and medicines, presented a bleak picture of a 
defeated and divided nation. But even more striking was the moral humiliation. German 
Protestants were now forced to face the fact that the Nazi regime which, for the most part, 
they had loyally supported, had betrayed their ideals, and made them accomplices in inhuman 
crimes on an unprecedented scale. The nation's total defeat had shattered the illusion that 
Lutheran orthodoxy could be combined with the goals of Nazism, along with its dreams of 
domination and conquest. Instead, church leaders were now confronted with an awareness 
of moral disaster, which was only exacerbated by the terrible and unrelenting revelations of 
atrocities committed in the name of Germany in the concentration camps and throughout the 
occupied countries. The result was disillusionment about the past and dismay for the future. 
The dilemma which Dietrich Bonhoeffer had perceived in 1939 had now become a calamitous 
reality: 
1M. Greschat, "Die Kirchen in der beiden deutschen Staaten nach 1945," Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 43, No. 12 (Dec. 1991), p. 262. 
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Christians in Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the defeat 
of their nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or willing the 
victory of their nation and thereby destroying our civilization. 2 
In these circumstances it was remarkable that the surviving church leaders had the 
courage to begin afresh in the attempt to make German Protestantism once again a living 
and creative reality. Their issuing of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt in October 1945, 
though highly disputed, was a sign of their determination to restore the church's witness by 
admitting their complicity in not combatting effectively enough the evils of Nazism, and by 
recognizing the need for a complete cleansing and spiritual renewal. 
The situation in East Germany was particularly grim, and was only heightened by 
indoctrinated fears of the ravages of the Russian occupation troops and consequent Soviet 
political oppression. In fact, however, church leaders, such as Otto Dibelius, newly-installed 
as bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg, were surprised by the Soviet military occupation's almost 
benevolent attitude which allowed church services to continue and church life to be revived. 
But subsequently when the Communist-led German Socialist Unity Party (SED) consolidated 
its hold and after the establishment in 1949 of the German Democratic Republic, the 
situation grew more difficult. The doctrinaire Marxists in charge made no secret of their 
hostility to the churches, which were regarded as survivals of a pre-socialist culture, due to 
be replaced by the historically-destined victory of atheistic Communism. The regime was 
determined to assert the supremacy of Marxism-Leninism in forging a new socialist ideology 
for the land of workers and peasants, which should become the irreversible pattern for the 
whole German people. Severe restrictions were placed upon the church's witness and 
outreach. The church was forced to retreat from its former positions of privilege and status, 
and many churchmen were led to believe that their only hope lay in the ever-retreating 
prospect of reunification with their fellow Lutherans in the west.3 
In the face of the Communists' strident charges that the Christian churches had been 
supine accomplices in the Nazis' wanton crimes and aggressions, the surviving members of 
the Confessing Church sought to put the record straight. They undertook to describe the 
dramatic events of their Church Struggle against Nazi misrule, to draw attention to their 
ordeals and sufferings at the Nazis' hands, and to chronicle the resistance efforts of their own 
heroes and martyrs. These were, to be sure, few in number. There was Paul Schneider, a 
2Eberhard Bethege, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography. (London: 1970), p. 736. 
3See R.W. Solberg, God and Caesar in East Germany. (New York: 1961); J.J. Siedel, 'Neubeginn' 
in der Kirche? Die evangelischen Landes und Provinzialkirchen in der SBZ/DDR im 
gesellschaftspolitischen Kontext der Nachkriegszeit (1945-1953), (G<>ttingen: 1989); Horst Dahn, 
Konfrontation oder Kooperation? Das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kirche in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1980, 
(Opladen: 1982). 
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fearless preacher, tortured to death in Buchenwald concentration camp in 1939; there was 
Martin Niemoller, who miraculously survived seven years in Sachsenhausen and Dachau as 
the Fuhrer's personal prisoner. But both his nationalist past and his unaccommodating and 
lacerating demands for contrition and repentance after his reappearance made his a 
controversial role model. And then there was Dietrich Bonhoeffer. But in 1945 Bonhoeffer 
was a relatively unknown figure. 4 He had never been in charge of a parish in Germany, 
and his conspiratorial activities against the Nazis had necessarily been secret. 
Not until1951, with the publication of his Letters and Papers from Prison, edited by his 
close associate Eberhard Bethege, did his deeds and ideas gain a wider audience. This small 
book, and Bethege's later superb biography, showed Bonhoeffer to have been a consistent 
opponent of Nazism from the beginning, whose insights and predictions had been strikingly 
vindicated by events.5 Here, it seemed, was a true example of the 'other Germany', a 
theologian whose Christian discipleship had led him to conspire against Hitler's evil regime, 
and to seek, if necessary, to overthrow it by force. The dreadful circumstances of his murder 
at the hands of the SS in Flossenburg concentration camp, only days before its liberation, 
added still greater poignancy to his words and stimulated interest in the work of this most 
promising theologian whose life had been so tragically cut short at the early age of thirty-
nine.6 
But it was not so much the desire to find a heroic exemplar from the days of the Church 
Struggle which gave Bonhoeffer's surviving writings their appeal. Rather it was the fact that, 
particularly in East Germany, there was an urgent need for a new theological vision, which 
could offer guidance in their unprecedented and troubled situation. For many East Germans 
Bonhoeffer's honesty, self-doubt, and self-criticism, as expressed in his unfinished and often 
enigmatic remarks about the future of Christianity in the post-war world, opened up new 
horizons and appeared to offer more forceful insights than did traditional orthodoxy. Many 
younger pastors were strongly attracted by the radicalism of his ideas, which were, in fact, 
to become one of the main formative theological influences in the East German churches 
during the 1960s and 1970s. 
4See Bethege, op.cit.; the character of this rather elitist, sometimes arrogant, and often priggish 
Prussian intellectual was, to be sure, appreciated by his small but influential circle of friends in the 
ecumenical movement abroad, such as Bishop George Bell of Chichester, as well as by the devoted 
but limited number of pupils whose studies he had directed at the Confessing Church's illegal 
seminary at Finkenwalde in Pomerania. 
5D. Bonhoeffer, Widerstand und Ergebung. (Munich: 1951), English trans, Letters and Papers 
from Prison. (London: 1953). 
6 As one observer remarked: "Bonhoeffer has been sweeping through the theological world like 
a fire," Ved Mehta, The New Theologian (London: 1965), pp. 145 ff; see also the 1974 video 
presentation by Malcolm Muggerridge, The Third Testament. Dietrich Bonhoeffer 1906-1945. 
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Bonhoeffer appealed for a new beginning. He called on the church to renounce its 
misguided tradition of providing theological justification for the nationalism and militarism 
of the past. He invited churchmen to accept the loss of their former privileges by becoming 
a serving, not a ruling, church. Christians, he believed, could now best witness by living 'for 
others' in a 'world come of age'. Furthermore, he asserted, in the secularized climate of the 
post-war world, attempts by religious establishments to stress man's dependence upon God 
or his church would increasingly fall on deaf ears. What was required in the future was a 
'religion-less Christianity' which would instead demonstrate its faith by participating in the 
sufferings of fellow-men, particularly of the poor, the weak and the marginalized in society. 
Here would be a true, if costly discipleship. 
Such ideas did not, however, find universal acclamation, especially in West Germany. 
Some West German church leaders, for example, were much more attracted by the notion that 
Lutheranism should now take advantage of the overthrow of Nazi paganism to finalize the 
spiritual vacuum by embarking on vigorous programme of 're-Christianizing' Germany, 
which also included a restoration of the church's former privileges.7 Many Germans, 
especially those of the older generation, still regarded Bonhoeffer with distrust. His 
imprisonment and execution, they believed, were due to his political treachery against Hitler, 
and such disloyalty was incompatible with their understanding of Romans 13. When the 
pastor and people of Flossenburg put up a plaque to commemorate Bonhoeffer, the then 
Lutheran bishop of Munich refused to have anything to do with the dedication, on the 
grounds that Bonhoeffer was a political casualty, not a Christian martyr.8 
But for many younger pastors in the German Democratic Republic, Bonhoeffer's message 
seemed particularly relevant to their situation. In the drastically changed political and social 
circumstances confronting their churches, they were well aware that they could not expect 
to return to the comfortable security of earlier years. Many believed that the lessons of the 
Church Struggle against Nazism necessitated a new approach, both theologically and 
politically. In East Berlin, for example, they formed the Weissensee Study Group, which was 
highly critical of the backward-looking views of their bishop, Dibelius, and instead 
welcomed the new impulses from Bonhoeffer's legacy. They were particularly encouraged 
1See the various contribution on this theme by M. Greschat: "Rechristianisierung und 
Sakularisierung. Anmerkunger zu einem europaischen konfessionellen Interpretationsmodell" in ed. 
J-C. Kaiser, Christentum und politische Verantwortung. Kirchen im Nachkriegsdeutschland, 
(Stuttgart: 1990), pp. 1-25; "Weder Neuanfang noch Restauration. Zum Interpretation der deutsche 
evangelische Kirchengeschichte nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg" in ed. U. Buttner, Das Unrechtsregime, 
(Hamburg: 1986), Vol II, pp. 326-57; "Zwischen Aufbruch und Beharrung. Die evangelische Kirche 
nach dem zweiten Weltkreig" in ed. V. Conzemius et al., Die Zeit nach 1945 als Thema kirchlichen 
Zeitgeschichte, (Gottingen: 1988), pp. 99-126. 
8Mehta, op. cit., p. 204. 
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by receiving support from the prominent Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, who had earlier been 
the leading theologian of the church struggle and who was now highly regarded in reformed 
Protestant circles around the world. In 1958, in a letter to a young East German pastor, Barth 
had adopted a surprisingly lenient stance towards the new G.D.R., and warned the churches 
against a doctrinaire anti-Communist attitude. In the following year, together with an East 
German student chaplain, Johannes Hamel, Barth published a small book, How to Serve God 
in a Marxist Land, which took an optimistic view of the Christian situation in East 
Germany.9 Barth and Hamel called on church members to remain true to the tenets of the 
Barmen Declaration of 1934 by refusing to see the Gospel as identified with 'the western way 
of life' or to idealize conditions in West Germany. Rather, Hamel wrote, Christians in East 
Germany should accept the revolutionary changes around them and make use of these 
changes as an opportunity: 
In the face of these powers, God calls His people, treading the path of the cross, to new 
obedience, new praise, new prayer, new endurance. He calls for the renewal of our 
Church and for the transformation of her patterns in order that she may serve Him in 
greater faithfulness. 10 
In such words we can surely recognize the influence of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
By the end of the 1950s it seemed clear that the German Democratic Republic, under 
the control of the Marxist-dominated SED, had come to stay.U The wishful thinking of 
many western politicians that the regime would disappear under pressure for reunification 
was belied by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which effectively cut off contacts 
between East and West. From the time of the second Berlin crisis of 1958, the East German 
government had subjected the churches to continuous pressure, which was only intensified 
in the following decade, demanding that they should separate themselves from fellow 
Lutherans in West Germany and particularly from the official structures of the Evangelische 
Kirche in Deutschland, i.e. the umbrella organization which up to then had linked both the 
western and eastern churches, and which had been one of the most active forces promoting 
national unity. After several years of heated debate the East German churches agreed in 
9Karl Barth and Johannes Hamel, How to Serve God in a Marxist Land. (New York: 1959). 
10J. Hamel, "The Gospel and the Christian life in the German Democratic Republic", quoted in 
Solberg, op. cit., p. 286. 
11The standard account of church developments is Robert F. Goecke!, The Lutheran Church 
and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change under Ulbricht and Honecker, (Ithaca, 
NY: 1990); other general assessments are to be found in Trevor Beeson, Discretion and Valour: 
Religious Conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe, (London: 1974), chap. 6, pp. 167 ff; for valuable 
summaries of later developments, see John Burgess, "Church-State Relations in East Germany. The 
Church as a 'religious' and 'political' force," Journal of Church State, 32 (Winter 1990), pp. 17ff; and 
"Preparing for the Fall of 1989: Religion and Democratization in East Germany, Soundings, LXXIV 
no. 2 (Spring/Summer 1991), pp. 45 ff. 
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1969 to the formation of the Bund der Evangelische Kirchen in der DDR, or Kirchenbund, a 
federation of the eight East German Protestant churches. By this move they relinquished 
many of their organizational ties with West Germany. At the same time the East Germans 
still affirmed their desire to retain a special but undefined relationship with their western 
colleagues. 
Such an accommodation to the pressures of the G.D.R. government was, of course, 
strongly resisted by staunch anti-Communists, such as Bishop Dibelius, who went so far as 
to question the moral authority of the G.D.R. state in terms of Romans 13. ·But Dibelius' 
wholehearted support for the Bonn Federal Republic, including its policies of remilitarization 
and its plans to install military chaplaincies had led to his being banned from the eastern half 
of his diocese. Resentment against his authoritarian style of leadership also added to the 
belief of many East German pastors that the time had come to seek a new style of Christian 
witness in circumstances which appeared irreversible for years to come. The need was now 
apparent for some new arrangement between the churches and the Communist authorities. 
No less striking was a change in the Marxist government's policy towards the churches. 
At first the regime had tried, like Hitler, to root out the influence of 'political clericalism' 
and in particular had forcibly repressed the churches' youth and education work. Its massive 
ideological campaign sought to discredit the 'reactionary superstitions' of all religions in order 
to pressure Christians to turn away from their traditional church loyalties, instead to embrace 
the more modern creed of Marxist-Leninist socialism. But with the consolidation of the 
regime in the 1960s its policy now began to recognize that forcible repression was counter-
productive and that the existence of the churches as social institutions would have to be 
tolerated for at least several more decades. This conclusion involved a similar change of 
tactics, in particular in the Ministry of State Security, nicknamed the Stasi. 
As we now know, the Stasi constituted the largest and most elaborate state secret police 
organization in the world. It is estimated that, at any one time, in addition to its full-time 
professional staff more than 100,000 'unofficial collaborators', i.e. paid or unpaid informers, 
were actively engaged in spying on their friends, neighbors, colleagues, and even families. 
The surviving files, containing information on more than four million East German citizens, 
occupy no less than 120 miles of office space.U Documents from this Ministry, newly 
available since 1989, are highly revealing and often personally shattering. But, in particular, 
they provide a graphic picture of the lurching, often contradictory practices adopted by the 
12Richard E. Koening, "The Churches and the Stasi," The Christian Century, (April 1992), pp. 
396-9. 
6 
Stasi in seeking to control and manipulate the churches.13 Even though the official policy 
remained firm in asserting that the churches were 'agents of political reaction', hand in glove 
with the West, and bent on overthrowing the GDR state, the Stasi's policy in the 1960s 
changed from one of outright intimidation to one of 'normalization'. The Stasi was now 
instructed to instigate increased measures of infiltration by building up its corps of 
'unofficial collaborators', to report in minute detail on all activities of the church bodies, and 
at the same time to influence church policies in directions desired by the regime. These 
multifarious activities were to be undertaken by a specially-created section XX/4 responsible 
for the surveillance and subversion of the churches. The vast extent of this Stasi network 
can now be seen to have been even more pervasive than anyone suspected. In the city of 
Leipzig, for example, no fewer than 120 such 'unofficial collaborators' were organized by the 
Stasi to spy on church activities, and the bishop himself was surrounded by a number of 
these individuals, including members of his diocesan office.14 
But, at the same time, the Stasi's practices were ambiguous. On the one hand it insisted 
on strict political control and was quick to suppress any open opposition. On the other hand 
it also sought to encourage so-called 'progressive elements' in the churches and to foster those 
church activities which might enhance the policies of the regime, especially abroad.15 
Selected and compliant individuals were allowed to travel to ecumenical meetings in foreign 
countries. Appointments to theological schools and faculties were given to those 
demonstrably loyal to the regime. Organizations such as the Christian Peace Conference were 
secretly subsidized in an attempt to support those Christians who opposed the western policies 
of remilitarization and nuclear rearmament and whose deliberations were blatantly exploited 
for propagandistic purposes. By such means the Stasi and its political masters played cat and 
mouse with the church authorities, alternating between repression and seduction, but never 
abandoning the determination to make the churches subservient to its overall goal of 
consolidating the 'socialist identity' of the German Democratic Republic. 
13See eds. Gerhard Besier and Stephan Wold, 'Pfarrer. Christen und Katholiken'. Das Ministerium 
fiir Staatsicherheit der ehemaligen DDR und die Kirchen. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: 1991 ). 
14Besier, op. cit., p. vi; according to the chief of the Stasi section for surveillance of church 
activities, Leipzig was under the average for the number of agents employed. 
15For example, as Goecke! noted, in February 1970, Gerald Gotting, chairman of the East 
German Christian Democratic Union party, and a faithful follower of the government party line, 
advised the churches "that they should support the efforts of the forces of peace in the world and 
make a contribution to a real European peace order: (in other words, work for the international 
legal recognition of the sovereignty and equal status of the GDR and the inviolability of the post-
1945 borders, including lobbying the West German churches in this respect). Likewise the churches 
should express "solidarity with all peoples in anti-imperialistic struggle" (in other words, lend moral 
and material support for Soviet-sponsored national liberation struggles, especially in Vietnam and 
the Middle East): Goecke!, op. cit., p. 114-5. 
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In these circumstances the church leaders in East Germany recognized that they faced 
two major challenges. On the one hand they were at pains to make clear to the East German 
government that they were not mere accomplices of a western-based plot to destabilize the 
regime. They therefore sought to establish their own independent decision-making organs, 
clearly separate from the all-German E.K.I.D. This led to deliberate measures to distance 
themselves from the West German churches and to demand the right to separate 
representation in such bodies as the World Council of Churches or the World Lutheran 
Federation. On the other hand they also recognized the need to uphold the witness and 
autonomy of the church against the totalitarian ambitions of an explicitly atheist Party and 
State. The result was the rise of a movement calling itself Kirche im Sozialismus, or Church 
within Socialism, which sought a distinctive proclamation of the Gospel, untainted by 
associations with the past errors of the church or with the anti-Communist stance of western 
Christians.16 
The most prominent advocate of this movement was Albrecht Schonherr, who became in 
1967 the acting and later the elected Bishop of East Berlin and Brandenburg, and 
simultaneously chairman of the East German Church Federation. He had been one of 
Bonhoeffer's first students at Finkenwalde, and, in the 1950's, was a member of the 
Weissensee Study Group. Theologically this group accepted Bonhoeffer's insight that 
"Christendom" in its traditional form was no longer a valid option. Instead, the East German 
churchmen saw that new patterns of discipleship Were called for in what was likely to 
remain--at least for the foreseeable future--a Marxist-controlled and indoctrinated society. 
The churches could no longer rely on their traditional sources of authority, backed by the 
power of the established government. Nor could they expect to play their well-known role 
as the guardians of the nation's conscience in matters of public morality. Nevertheless they 
were determined to seek to remain a relevant and creative minority and rejected the 
temptation of becoming a pietistic sect, concerned only with its own personal salvation or 
preaching only about the world to come. Instead they wanted to be actively engaged as 
Christians in an atheistic state without surrendering the traditions of their faith. They were 
called, they believed, to be "there for the world, just as Christ was there for the world," not 
merely for their own members, but for non-Christians as well.17 
16This motto would appear to have been first adopted at the 1971 Synod of the Church 
Federation, meeting in Eisenach, see H-J. Roeder, "Kirche im Sozialismus: Anmerkungen zum 
Selbstverstandinis der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR", Kirche im Sozialismus, 4, (June 1977), 
p. 90; and W. Bindemann, "Kirche im Sozialismus," Standpunkt, 17, No. 12, (December 1989), pp. 
320ff. 
17E. Adler, ed., Pro-Existence. (London: 1964), p. 36. 
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The theological justification of such an unprecedented and hazardous stance was 
expressed by Heino Falcke, the head of one of the church's theological colleges, in 1972: 
We cannot accept withdrawal from the secular world into sacred isolation. Were we to 
settle for that we would be falsifying the gospel of freedom into a spare-time gospel. 
We would ourselves be victims of the misunderstanding that declares the gospel to be an 
instrument of man's alienation rather than of his social liberation. We would be 
conceding that man's political maturity depends on his liberation from Christ rather than 
on being liberated by Christ.18 
It was on this basis that Schonherr and other church leaders sought a fresh start in their 
relationship with the Communist state. On the one hand they heeded the warning of the 
Church Struggle's most significant statement, the Barmen Declaration, that no dominant 
ideology should be allowed to dictate the church's doctrines and polity.19 It was on these 
grounds that some pastors opposed the separate creation of the Kirchenbund. On the other 
hand they also heeded the call for Christians to witness wherever God had placed them. 
Could God leave empty spaces ont he map? If not, how was he at work in the GDR? The 
Church needed to share in the confusion and struggle of each age, not to sit above parties 
or above the clouds. For, as Bonhoeffer had insisted, the church "in which Jesus Christ .. 
. is presently active as its Lord", cannot be "placeless." 
In line with these views the churches sought to adopt a position of critical solidarity 
within their particular socialist society, not beside it, not against it, but certainly not 
endorsing it. The short slogan Kirche im Sozialismus--or as SchOnherr later preferred 'The 
Christian in a world come of age'--became the benchmark of this movement, seeking to 
stress its political contribution through service to the welfare of the whole community. This 
stance involved a deliberate refusal to adopt a ghetto-like existence or the mentality of a 
diaspora. It also meant refusing the idea that the state would impose its totalitarian goals on 
the whole of society. Instead it sought to adopt a thoughtful concept of how Christians 
should take their place as citizens in a post-Christian society. Schonherr was clear that this 
entailed steering a course between the twin dangers of a total acceptance or a total rejection. 
The great danger of accommodation lies in the temptation for a powerless church to 
seek its own institutional survival by sacrificing its freedom and the fullness of the 
18H. Falcke, quoted in Beeson, op. cit., p. 185. 
19See for example, Schonherr's remarks on "The Legacy of the Church Struggle in contemporary 
Germany", lecture at the 22nd Annual Scholars' Conference, Seattle 1992; L. de Maiziere, "Zwischen 
Anpassung und Verwiegerung. Konsequenzen aus dem Leben in einem totalitaren Staat," Kirchliche 
Zeitgeschichte, Vol 4, No 2 (1991), pp. 412 ff. 
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Gospel. But the danger of rejection lies in the false assumption that an atheist and 
totalitarian state can only produce error in all its operations. 20 
Leading members of the Communist regime, however, reacted with suspicion to such an 
attempt to revitalize the East German Church. Similarly many of the church's own members 
were skeptical for traditionalist reasons. Several years were to pass before the church leaders 
could find acceptance for this new position of 'critical solidarity,' or as some termed it 'pro-
existence.' The model followed was that of the Confessing Church during the Nazi years, 
treading the thin dividing line between compromise and opposition and seeking to safeguard 
their institutional freedom while resisting the pervasive surveillance, harassment, and often 
unpredictable repression to which they were subjected.21 Nonetheless as SchOnherr reminded 
his audiences, the real question for Christians had been posed by Bonhoeffer in one of his 
enigmatic prison reflections: "After 2000 years of church history, during which the church 
had often enough demanded that others should be there for her, rather than she for them, 
'are we still of any use?'"22 Bonhoeffer's positive answer, from his cheerless cell in Tegel 
jail, gave them the courage to seek to forge new patterns of costly discipleship. 
The strongly ethical emphasis on service, derived from Bonhoeffer's legacy, saw the East 
German churches maintain and extend throughout the country a vast network of social 
service agencies--hospitals for the mentally-ill, old-age homes, hostels for delinquent youth 
and alcoholics, kindergartens for the young, church choirs, publishing houses, retreat centers 
and most significantly their own theological schools. 23 By such means they were able to 
demonstrate their positive contribution to the life of the socialist-dominated state and had 
won the grudging admission in 1960 from the Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, that 
"Christianity and the humanistic goals of socialism are not contradictory."24 For its part the 
2
°For the part played by Bonhoeffer's theology in fashioning these concepts, see '"Kirche fUr 
anders' in der DDR: Gesprach mit dem Erfurter Probst Falcke zur Bedeutung Bonhoeffers fiir den 
Weg der Kirche," Kirche im Sozialismus, 12 (April 1986), pp. 59-63; see also A. SchOnherr, 
Abenteuer der Nachfolge. (Berlin: 1988), particularly "Die Religionskritik Dietrich Bonhoeffers in 
ihrer Bedeutung fUr das Christsein in der DDR," pp. 239 ff. 
21The details of this repression are described in Besier/Wolk, ~. (note 13 above). 
22A. SchOnherr, Horizont und Mitte. (Munich: 1972); "Impulse aus der Theologie Bonhoeffers 
fur den Weg der Christen in den sozialistischen Gesellschaft der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik", pp. 140 ff, quoting D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 1971 ed., (New York: 
1971), p. 16. 
23By the end of the 1980's, these institutions were together receiving state subsidies amounting 
to 239 million east marks, see P. Maser, Glauben in Sozialismus, 2nd ed., Berlin 1989, pp. 92 ff. 
24Quoted in Goecke!, op cit., p. 58; in private conversations with leading theologians such as 
Emil Fuchs in Leipzig in 1961 or with the Bishop of Thiiringen, Mitzenheim in 1964, Ulbricht had 
similarly referred to the common ideals and humanistic responsibility which united Marxists and East 
German Christians--though only to draw a distinction between these latter and their West German 
10 
state now began to see the value of exploiting the churches' contacts abroad as a means of 
gaining greater international recognition for the sovereignty and equal status of the German 
Democratic Republic. 25 By the end of the 1970s the results seemed encouraging. 
A notable meeting between the SED chief, Erich Honecker, and Albrecht SchOnherr in 
March 1978 paved the way for a grater rapprochement. The church leaders were now 
prepared to distinguish between dictatorships of the right and left, were ready to affirm the 
allegedly humanistic goals of Marxism, and even saw the prophetic role of the church as 
recalling the regime to its own best intentions. For their part the Communist authorities saw 
this meeting as a new sign of the "readiness of the Evangelical churches to cooperate in the 
formation of the socialist society. It is the end of an often painful learning and re-evaluation 
process amongst the churches." The SED leaders also noted that the churches were 
demonstrating an "increased sense of loyalty to the GDR, and were using their influence in 
the World Council of Churches to strengthen the interests of the younger churches in the 
Third World and the socialist states."26 Hence they were prepared to postpone the 'inevitable' 
victory of atheistic materialism, to tolerate the church's existence as the embodiment of an 
alternative value system, and to allow it a relative freedom to conduct its own affairs within 
limits, which however were always subject to the regime's ideological purposes. 
Pragmatically this development gave the churches a new sense of direction and purpose, 
though at the price of recognizing the distinct identity of the German Democratic Republic 
by acknowledging that, ideologically as well as geographically, they were now on separate 
paths from their fellow Lutherans in the West. The justification for this jettisoning of much 
of the church's political heritage, it may be suggested, was to be found in Bonhoeffer's well-
known words urging renunciation of past privileges and a willing identification with the new 
social conditions. 27 
Despite this evidence of a more harmonious relationship between the state and church 
leadership, the Stasi still retained its ingrained suspicion and wariness. Its agents continued 
to see the churches as potential destabilizers of the regime and in any case were not ready 
to abandon their habit of seeking to control every aspect of the nation's existence. The Stasi 
included in its espionage network not only well-known opponents but also those church 
fellow Lutherans., see John A. Moses, "The Church's role in the collapse of Communism in East 
Germany 1989-90", Colloauium 23/3, 1991, p. 127. 
26 According to a directive issued by the Stasi: "The churches should no longer be regarded 
primarily as destabilizing elements in the development of socialism. The Evangelical and Catholic 
churches are not hostile institutions," quoted in Besier/Wolf, op. cit., p. 28. 
26Quoted in Besier/Wolf, op. cit., pp. 31-6. 
27Bonhoeffer, op.cit., p. 299. 
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leaders who could be regarded as 'trustworthy' and especially those who had contacts with 
the West. Instructions were issued for "measures to reduce the churches' attempts to become 
a collecting point for hostile forces or to misuse opposition movements, by spreading their 
political influence and religious views." Furthermore under the leadership of the Soviet 
Office of Security, a common plan should be worked out "to oppose the aggressively 
ideological claims of the Vatican and to attack both the position of Pope John Paul II and the 
Catholic' Church."28 
The ambivalence of the GDR authorities was openly apparent in 1983 during the 
festivities commemorating the SOOth anniversary of Luther's birth. The SED leader, 
Honecker, took a personal interest in promoting this event, but his underlings in the Stasi saw 
these celebrations as an opportunity to increase the staff of their church section and to 
employ even more 'unofficial collaborators' to spy on church activities. Subsequently in 
February 1985 the Stasi chief, Mielcke, issued new instructions, calling for more agents to 
be recruited principally from 
active church members, including youth and students, from the protestant and 
catholic youth groups; students of theology, art or literature; relatives of the 
scientific, artistic and medical intellectual classes; individuals who are professionally 
engaged in ecological concerns, or others who devote themselves to nature and 
ecology in the so-called alternative life-styles.29 
The Stasi undoubtedly believed that such measures would enhance their control and 
manipulation of the church and its leaders. They failed to recognize that the church leaders 
were themselves under constant pressure from their followers, whose wishes they had to 
listen to if they were not to lose all credibility. At the same time the church leaders' hopes 
for a new atmosphere of Christian-Marxist dialogue and their pleas for a more open political 
climate were disappointed, especially after the regime refused to listen to demands for a 
liberalization of its travel and emigration restrictions. 
One of the most significant demonstrations of the East German churches' social 
engagement came in the 1980s with their championing of the peace movement. The churches 
articulated and supported the widely-felt, if often sentimental, pacifist views of significant 
sections of the population. Numerous Synod declarations were issued, expressing moral 
outrage at the senseless slaughter and bloodshed of war, along with fervent protests against 
the folly of the arms race or the rapacity of armament manufacturers, demands that resources 
could be more profitably deployed than in military alliances, or the belief that war was 
incompatible with the commands of the Christian gospel. The East German churches refused 
28Quoted in Besier/Wolf, op. cit., p. 45. 
29Instruction of the State Secretary for Security, Mielcke, 20 February 1985, quoted in 
Besier/Wolf, op. cit., p. 437. 
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to limit their campaign solely to denunciations of the West, as the regime demanded, but 
courageously called for concessions closer to home, such as respect for the rights of 
conscientious objectors. Such a stance was risky both theologically and politically, since 
Lutheran theology had traditionally repudiated Christian pacifism, and continued to do so 
in the west. 30 
Predictably the SED regime and the Stasi closely monitored the churches' organization 
of the peach movement but were divided as to how to counteract any advantages the 
churches might seek to gain. On the one hand they welcomed the churches' pronouncements 
and those of the Christian Peace Conference, which denounced the remilitarization plans of 
NATO and in particular the decision to deploy rocket missiles on West German territory. On 
the other hand they refused to listen to the churches' objections to the introduction in 1978 
of military instruction as a compulsory subject in all ninth and tenth grades in the GDR's 
high schools. In the following year the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and in 1980 the 
strong-arm intervention against the Solidarity movement in Poland were vigorously endorsed 
by the GDR government. Stringent measures were adopted to prevent any demonstrations 
of opposition or inflammatory statements on behalf of the victims which might have had a 
spillover effect. In November 1981 the churches proclaimed a Decade for Peace, when 
thousands of their followers spontaneously adopted the symbol of swords being beaten into 
plowshares to wear as patches or buttons on their clothing. These were promptly confiscated 
by the Stasi, and orders were given to repress any activities which might weaken the 
readiness of the people to defend the G.D.R. militarily against its enemies.31 
Nevertheless despite this partial crackdown, the churches' initiatives in the peace 
movement gave them confidence that they could address other issues of concern to the 
citizens of the G.D.R. The churches' sense of autonomy and influence as a moral factor was 
strengthened. Groups and individuals otherwise quite outside the churches' liturgical life 
now found support and a common bond in prayer meetings for peace or in discussions about 
common problems in social life. Here, it can be said, the churches, especially at the local 
level and with the help of the Evangelical Academies, resolutely lived up to the ideals of 
Kirche im Sozialismus, by becoming the voice of the voiceless and by appealing to the regime 
to embark on an open and frank dialogue with the people. 
It was principally because of this theologically-based conviction that the churches were 
not prepared to follow the path of resignation, cynical accommodation or withdrawal into 
the sphere of private life, which was so marked a characteristic of much of the general 
population. Indeed the inhabitants of the GDR had grown accustomed, from childhood up, 
30See F. Alt, Frieden ist moglich. Die Politik der Bergpredigt. (Munich: 1989). 
31See Maser, op. cit., pp. 114-5. 
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to live schizophrenically, dividing their lives between what they thought or desired privately 
and what they were openly allowed to express. Seldom did anyone dare to voice his or her 
real opinions, and this taboo led to a resigned acceptance of the increasingly glaring 
contradiction between their actual situation and the glorified propaganda of the regime's 
pronouncements. But the churches, as Helmut Zeddies noted,82 were resolved, as the only 
institution independent of the bureaucratic centralism of the SED, to break through this 
deliberately enforced tissue of lies, and to muster whatever influence and credibility they still 
enjoyed, seeking to become the advocate of all those who had been for so long excluded from 
the significant decision-making process of this 'socialist' society. Increasingly, therefore, the 
churches provided not only the physical facilities, but more importantly, the organizational 
encouragement for a large number of other popular initiatives, sponsoring discussion .of 
human rights, ecology, women's issues, the position of homosexuals, or the problems of 
underdevelopment in Third World countries. Such groups offered opportunities for wide-
ranging debate, free from the ideological and political regimentation of the State and Party. 
Particularly for the young, these gatherings were an alternative social meeting ground in an 
atmosphere of open and friendly solidarity, which then became a crystallization point for 
political protest. In church halls and basements in Leipzig, Dresden, Magdeburg, and East 
Berlin, the churches put themselves at the front of popular pressures for reform.33 
Particularly notable in this connection was the series of meetings called to discuss the 
project, adopted world-wide by the World Council of Churches, to promote Peace, Justice 
and the Integrity of Creation. These initiatives were significant not only because they served 
to build a bridge between the prudent stance of the church leaders and the radicalism of the 
more outspoken protesters. They also achieved an ecumenical involvement of the Roman 
Catholic Church, hitherto a rather withdrawn community. But above all the explicit concern 
for world peace and justice and the emphasis on environmental protection undermined the 
regime's long-standing claim that the churches had done nothing to oppose the exploitative 
capitalism of western countries. 
32H. Zeddies, "Das Jahr Nach Der Wende. Die Rolle der Kirchen im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch 
der DDR," in ed. J. Becker, Wiedervereinigung in Mitteleuropa. Aussen- und Innenansichten zur 
staatlichen Einheit Deutschlands. (Munich: 1992), p. 203. 
33Goeckel downplays the church's role, and prefers the view that'these "grassroots groups of 
peace activists, often only loosely associated with the church, assumed the role of impetus and 
catalyst on these issues." In particular, "a heightened sense of efficacy on the part of the East 
German youth, and lower perceived costs of political dissent combined" to cultivate a more self-
conscious and assured "alternative political culture": Goecke!, op. cit., p. 260; predictably the Stasi 
saw these activities are being promoted by the "sworn ·~nemies of socialism", Besier /Wolf, op. cit., 
p. 73. 
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The rapid growth and often spontaneous success of these activities, however, resulted in 
a considerable dilemma for the church leaders. Some of the more activist pastors, such as 
Rainer Eppelmann of the Gethsemane Church in East Berlin, welcomed these 'basis groups' 
as the means for a critical evaluation of the regime's performance and endorsed their 
demands for the church to show solidarity with their often utopian ideas for the renewal of 
society. But the bishops, although sensitive to the reformers' accusations that their seeming 
half-heartedness was betraying their own biblical and theological premises, were also very 
conscious of the likelihood of the state's repressive reactions. The uncontrollable activities 
of such 'basis groups' endangered the 'modus vivendi' which the church leaders believed they 
had established with the state since 1978. Their practice of trying to settle all outstanding 
difficulties by diplomatic means through confidential talks with the state authorities was not 
being openly challenged from below. 
Outwardly the church leaders sought to claim that the protests of these church-sponsored 
'basis groups' were constructive and positive in intent, as they enabled the citizens to 
contribute to the nationallife.34 But in the following years it became clear that this kind of 
eirenical approach was not enough. The church leaders found themselves criticized for their 
supposed reluctance to adopt a more explicit political stance in opposition to the regime. Yet 
open support for such 'basis groups' conflicted with their obvious unwillingness to 
countenance a return to the embattled situation of earlier decades. 
This radicalizing tendency received even greater impetus after President Gorbachev's 
proclamation of the advantages of glasnost and perestroika. Expectations were aroused that 
this 'wind of change' from the Soviet Union would extend to East Germany and resulted in 
an enormous escalation of popular support for the lead offered by the churches in 
articulating and mobilizing the desire for a more humane form of socialism in the daily life 
of the people.35 
In this tense situation the contradictions in the regime's church policy became more and 
more apparent. In November 1987 just when the GDR's Secretary for Church Affairs, 
Klaus Gysi, was paying an unprecedented visit to the World Council of Churches in Geneva 
to express his government's support, the hardliners at home were preparing to take even 
stronger measures to suppress any dissent. At the end of the same month the Stasi conducted 
a forcible search of the Zion Church in East Berlin, confiscated large quantities of books and 
papers from its library, and arrested two of the church workers. It took all the tact and 
diplomacy of the church's officials to secure their release. 
34Synod of the Church Federation, Dresden 1985, quoted in H. Knabe, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte. Beliage zur Das Parlament, Vol 1-2, 1990, 5 Jan. 1990. 
35Evangelische Pressedienst, No 39a, 1988, p. 8. 
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Despite the evidence that some of the Stasi leaders opposed any moves which would draw 
critical reactions from abroad, the hardliners won. Gysi was summarily retired, and in 
February 1988 the Presiding Bishop, Werner Leich, was summoned to meet with the· · · · 
Politburo member responsible for church affairs, Jarowinsky, who forthdghtly accused the 
churches of encouraging open opposition to the regime's policies. 
For their part the bishops prudently avoided any statements which could be seen as 
inciting their followers to open resistance. Theologically they reaffirmed the Confessing 
Church's view of 1934 that the church was not called to interfere with the state's legitimate 
task or to see itself as an opposition party seeking the regime's downfall. Instead they soberly 
appealed to the existing state authorities to provide for justice and peace and to adopt the 
kind of policies which would gain acceptance and support from ordinary church members. 
At the same time they resisted demands from their more strident supporters for even more 
sweeping changes. Some of the more utopian and irresponsible remedies proposed clearly 
troubled the church leaders. As Bishop Leich remarked: "The Church is there for everyone, 
but not for everything."36 
This new political momentum, however, and the evidence that the government was 
unwilling to alter its entrenched position, raised doubt in many quarters about the continued 
validity of the movement Kirche im Sozialismus. What kind of 'socialism' had the churches 
been endorsing, and should they continue to do so? Had they not lent too much moral 
authority to the regime whose repressive character, bureaucratic ineptness, and failure to 
satisfy the economic and social desires of its citizens was not only too apparent? Some 
observers believed--as western churchmen had already claimed--that the church leaders had 
been too ready to compromise with the authorities or even that they had been suborned into 
complicity with the infamous Stasi. 37 It was notable that, already by the mid-1980s, 
following Bishop SchOnherr's retirement, his successors took pains to distance themselves 
from the earlier optimism of the Kirche im Sozialismus movement as they became more 
aware of its negative political implications. These reservations, to be sure, were related more· 
to the ambiguity of the slogan than to the validity of its theological presuppositions. 
Nevertheless the bishops had to face increasing opposition from within their own ranks to 
this whole attempt to steer the church through the troubled waters of church-state relations 
by careful mediating navigation. 
36Quoted in G. Krusche, "Das prophetische Wachteramt" in ed. H. Knabe, Aufbruch in eine 
andere DDR. (Hamburg: 1990), p. 103. 
37Such charges were to be substantiated in a highly controversial form following the publication 
in 1991 by Besier and Wolf (see note 13 above) of a massive volume of Stasi documents, which 
revealed the enormous extent of the Stasi's successful infiltration of the church leadership at all 
levels throughout the forty years of the GDR's existence. 
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Such criticisms were expressed not only by Lutheran traditionalists who objected to the 
alleged left-leaning proclivities of the church leadership, whose tacit endorsement of the lies 
and absurdity of 'real existing socialism' they found to be aJ>palling.38 More radical 
churchmen, too, sought to revive the long-suppressed but inherently Protestant thirst for 
justice. They now publicly called on their leaders to adopt an unambiguously challenging 
stance towards the regime. Already in 1982 the valiant but abrasive Ranier Eppelmann had 
issued his 'Berlin Appeal--Creating Peace without Weapons' which was critical of his 
superiors' accommodating policies. And in 1987 Friedrich Schorlemmer, head of the 
theological college in Luther's monastery in Wittenberg, had been even more outspoken in 
speaking of "the ruins of the concept of Kirche im Sozialismus,"39 and in denouncing the 
prevarications of the bishops. The reformist initiative of the 'basis groups', he declared, had 
too often been frustrated by the careful calculations of the church authorities, who were 
looking over their shoulders to see what would be the likely consequences, asking themselves: 
How would the ruling Party react? How would such protests be exploited by sensationalist 
treatments in the western press? What would be the consequences for their own followers? 40 
While Schorlemmer's protests may have been inspired by Luther's well-known hunger and 
thirst for righteousness, his demands were secular and concrete: 
We demand that the communists abandon their monopoly of truth which they exercise 
with force and also give up the claim to have a superiority of judgement in principle in 
matters affecting society because only a lively culture of debate about the truth and the 
best way to constitute human co-existence leads to a humane and just world capable of 
surviving into the future. 
He no longer held out any hope for the kind of rapprochement which Kirche im 
Sozialismus had once represented since: 
As the development of socialist states has shown, the bureaucratization, corruption of 
officials, conformism, dogmatism, the caprice of officialdom and fear of those in power, 
have given rise to depression in the community, and the very essence of socialism is 
discredited. We regard it as a matter of urgency not only to expose such things but also 
to correct the abuses in our country.41 
These discontents mounted to a critical pitch after the communal elections of May 1989, 
when the duplicity of the regime's carefully stage-managed results was revealed through 
the churches' own observers. No longer was the population prepared to tolerate the long-
38R. Heinrich, Das vormundschaftliche Staat: vom Versagen des realen existierenden Sozialismus. 
(Hamburg: 1991), p. 233, quoted in Moses, op. cit., p. 129. 
39Quoted in Besier/Wolf, QQ....£it., p. 55. 
4
°F. Schorlemmer, Traume und Alptraume. Einmischungen 1982-90. (Berlin: 1990), and Worte 
offnen Fauste. (Munich: 1992). 
41Quoted in Moses, op. cit., p. 130; Maiziere, op. cit, p. 417. 
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enforced dichotomy between outward acceptance and inward denial. Their pent-up feelings 
of outrage and betrayal led to open denunciations of the state's falsifications and united all 
sections of community in their resolve to obtain change and renewal. 
Despite these striking developments the bishops were not yet prepared to abandon their 
previous stance. Their prudence led them to seek to preserve the church's autonomy in order 
to fulfill its primary liturgical and pastoral tasks. The church was called, first and foremost, 
to worship God not to organize political protests. The bishops were moved more by a 
Lutheran theological conservatism than by any attachment to the existing regime, whose 
slings and arrows they had suffered at first hand for so long. Their fears that the state 
authorities would use their power forcibly to stamp out all opposition were not unjustified 
and were only enhanced when the German Communist hierarchy gave its public approval to 
the Chinese government's bloody suppression of the student uprisings of June 1989. If some 
of the bishops now had second thoughts about their earlier endorsements of the regime or 
were dismayed that their hopes for improvement in church-state relations were being so 
openly disavowed by their own followers, the blame seemed clearly to lie in the bankruptcy 
and failures of the state's policies. 
As the atmosphere in 1989 became daily and palpably more dangerous, the church 
leaders' advice to their pastors was therefore to seek to find means of both harnessing and 
yet controlling this potentially explosive situation. It was in no small part due to the 
interventions of the churches that bloodshed was averted and the waves of public resentment 
were directed into constructive channels. The clergy made repeated and united pleas for 
peace and for the abstention from all forms of violence. This was perhaps the· most 
significant contribution the churches made to the whole process of revolutionary change. 
The traumatic events of the autumn of 1989, the collapse of the Communist Party's 
authority, and above all the spectacular breaching of the Berlin Wall, unleashed an enormous 
wave of public jubilation and relief.42 At last it seemed the time had come to affirm a very 
different destiny for Germany and to institute a new era of political and cultural self-
determination, which would lead to a more humane and democratic form of socialism, freed 
from the Stalinist distortions and oppressions of the past forty years. 
Church reformers, such as Friedrich Schorlemmer, or Heino Falcke, now pleaded for a 
return to the roots of Christian socialism, based on the biblical vision of righteousness, 
whereby the ideals of the Gospel could be realized in peace and freedom. They urged their 
42For the role of the churches in these dramatic days, see John S. Conway, "How to serve God 
in a non-Marxist land? East German Protestantism's contribution to the peaceful revolution," 
Journal of Religious History, 16, No 2, (Dec. 1990), pp. 126 ff; also Moses, op. cit.; ed. J. Swoboda, 
Die Revolution der Kerzen. Christen in den Unwalzungen der DDR. (Wuppertal: 1990); also the 
collection of documents Die protestantische Revolution 1987-1990. Ein deutsches Lesebuch. (Berlin: 
1990). 
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fellow churchmen to accept Bonhoeffer's notion of ~deputyship' (stellvertretendes Handeln) 
and to take up the task of responsible political leadership in the search for a new reformed 
identity for the German Democratic Republic.43 
In the immediate aftermath of the Wende, this appeal was widely heeded. Pastors, 
theologians and church officials were entrusted with political and communal responsibilities 
at all levels, largely to fill the political vacuum. They were frequently invited to chair 
'Round Table' discussions at which all points of view for political and social renewal were 
eagerly debated. In the first free elections for the East German parliament in March 1990, 
many such churchmen and women were called to fill high positions, including the Prime 
Minister, Lothar de Maiziere, and two of his Cabinet, as well as the leader of the majority 
Socialist opposition party, and later and more controversially, Manfred Stolpe, legal director 
of the central church office, who became the socialist premier of the newly-created state of 
Brandenburg. It was to be their finest hour. 
But already this bold experiment was doomed to failure. The unstoppable demand for 
re-unification with West Germany and for the entire liquidation of the East German state 
forced the abandonment of any hope for an independent, self-determining, and reformist 
East German community. The advocates of such a programme, including those in the 
churches, could only regard the precipitate rush into the arms of West German 'mammonism' 
as a disaster. The subsequent disappointment and disillusionment among many churchmen 
in the east was notable. The whole attempt to foster a separate and better identity for a 
'reformed socialist' Germany was shown to be an illusion. Spokesmen for this point of view, 
who continued to uphold this ideal even after the decisive events of the Wende, now once 
again became prophets in the wilderness. 44 Their belief that such a new order would be 
morally superior, not merely to the past, but to any future arrangement with West Germany, 
was perhaps their most valid point, but their refusal to acknowledge the overwhelming desire 
for improved economic conditions was self-defeating. Even more crucial was their 
unwillingness to recognize the impracticality of their vision of society, with its puritanical 
appeal to ~higher' gains through self -restraint and self -denial. As was pointed out, 
the collective desire to be reunited with the other 'better' half of a divided nation proved 
far more effective than any attempts to breathe life into the tired and reluctant phantom 
of a socialism with a human face ... The suggestion that the GDR should be the site of yet 
another socialist experiment ... was not surprisingly unpalatable particularly given the 
43See J. Burgess, "Religion and Democratization", .Q.Jl....£.it., pp. 51ff. 
44See the highly critical article by Jens Motschmann, "Evangelische Kirche und 
Wiedervereiningung" in ed. K. Low, Ursachen und Verlauf der deutschen Revolution 1989. (Berlin: 
1991 ), pp. 65-84. 
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recent experiences of the East German population with similar chiliastic promised of 
fulfillment.'15 . 
No less damaging were the revelations of how far complicity with the former Stasi had 
extended, even in the churches. Coming to terms with the record of the Communist past 
now threatened to become as divisive and painful as the still unresolved earlier attempts to 
deal with the Nazi years. 
It is still too early to tell whether history will judge Kirche im Sozialismus to have been 
a failed political experiment or an over-idealistic theological aberration. On the one hand 
its supporters are right to claim success in shaking off tlie ties which had for years so long 
associated the Lutheran church with the aristocratic landed establi~h.ment a.ad·its pol~ical 
structures. The church leaders accepted the loss of their previous status and identity and 
resisted the temptation of becoming a politically-hostile minority in a socially irrelevant 
ghetto. Instead they sought a positive, if limited, engagement in society by stressing 
Bonhoeffer's ideal of being a church of service and witness available to all. They attempted 
to build bridges of understanding between Christianity and Marxism, in the hopes of 
overcoming the social and political divisions which had characterized a hundred years of 
hostility between the church and Germany's working classes. They made strenuous efforts 
to preach repentance for the church's failure to withstand Nazism more faithfully, and laid 
the groundwork for a totally new relationship between Christians and Jews. In short, they 
introduced a new stance into Lutheran practice by emphasizing openness to the world, 
concern for the suffering and marginalized, and a commitment to personal and social 
liberation, and thereby sought to overcome the narrowness of horizons of earlier years. 
But at the same time these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the steady erosion 
of church support in East Germany. As John Burgess has noted, between 1949 ·and 1989, 
nominal affiliation with the church fell from 82% to 31%, and the number of active 
participants was far fewer.46 How far the particular theological stance of Kirche im 
Sozialismus contributed to this decline will be a matter of debate. Even more disputed will 
be the current perception that, by seeking to become a positive force in the 'real existing 
socialist' society, its advocates made too many compromises. Undoubtedly the search for a 
pragmatic working relationship with the state led to a readiness on the part of the church 
leaders to accept the legitimacy of the Marxist-Leninist political order. The church's defence 
of the victims of political injustice often appeared inconsistent and tempered by 
opportunism. The leaders' dealings with the State and the Stasi seemed--at least in 
45Alison Lewis, "1989 and the Crisis of East German Writers and Intellectuals," German Studies 
Review, Vol 15, No 2 (1992), p. 257. 
46See J. Burgess, "Religion and Democratization," op. cit., p. 47. 
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retrospect--to have been too often marked by equivocation. Furthermore they showed a 
willingness at times to accept the view, often propagated by sympathizers abroad, that the 
East German church was a church of suffering, which by its renunciation of the material 
wealth of the capitalist world, had demonstrated a spiritually superior form of discipleship. 
There was certainly an element of wishful thinking in the belief that Christians and Marxists 
could together build a more perfect society, despite all the evidence of the corruption and 
failure of idealism which marked the GDR's totalitarian regime. It was even more of an 
illusion for the church leaders to believe that such a system was reformable or that 'socialism 
with a human face' could be produced by a regime, which, from its enforced establishment 
in 1949 to its hapless end in 1990, had never obtained democratic endorsement from the 
people. 
Whether the course adopted by East German Protestantism, and in particular the Kirche 
im Sozialismus movement, was a path-breaking pattern for the church's future discipleship 
or. alternatively only encouraged an illusionary utopianism, are concerns which will 
preoccupy theologians and churchmen alike as the church now struggles to find a new 
identity for its religious and political witness in the years ahead. 
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